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Abstract 
This article evaluates the meaningful engagement doctrine in the 
education rights jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court in the 
light of a set of normative principles developed by Susan Sturm 
for evaluating participatory public law remedies. It commences 
by identifying four principles for evaluating participatory remedies 
appropriate to South African constitutional law and 
jurisprudence. Thereafter the relevant jurisprudence is analysed 
and evaluated in the light of these principles. The article 
concludes by making proposals for the development of 
meaningful engagement as a participatory remedy in educational 
rights disputes. These proposals seek to ensure a better 
alignment between the meaningful engagement remedy and the 
four remedial principles identified.  
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1 Introduction  
In Fose v Minister of Safety and Security1 (Fose), the Constitutional Court 
encouraged the Courts to be creative and innovative in crafting remedial 
tools to ensure the effective vindication of constitutional rights. Courts have 
a responsibility to craft effective remedies when the legal process 
establishes an infringement of constitutional rights, particularly in a context 
"where so few have the means to enforce their rights through the courts."2  
The need for remedial innovation is particularly acute in the context of 
school governance disputes which implicate the complex set of educational 
rights entrenched in section 29 of the Constitution.3 Such disputes have 
brought into sharp relief the tensions between redressing the legacy of 
apartheid education,4 on the one hand, and respecting the integrity of local 
school governance, on the other.5  
Three significant educational rights judgments of the Constitutional Court – 
Head of Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo6 
(Hoërskool Ermelo), Head of Department, Department of Education, Free 
State Province v Welkom High School7(Welkom High School), and MEC for 
Education v Governing Body of the Rivonia Primary School8 (Rivonia 
                                            
* Sandra Liebenberg, BA LLB (UCT) LLM (Essex) LLD (Wits). Distinguished Professor 
and H. F. Oppenheimer Chair in Human Rights Law, University of Stellenbosch Law 
Faculty. Email: sliebenb@sun.ac.za. I thank two anonymous referees for helpful 
comments received. Research funding is received from the National Research 
Foundation. Any opinion, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed in this 
article are those of the author, and the NRF does not accept any liability in regard 
thereto.  
1  Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC). 
2  Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 69. 
3  Section 29 of the Constitution is a complex provision encompassing an unqualified 
right to basic education; a qualified right to further education; a right to receive 
education in the official language of one’s choice in public education institutions where 
"reasonably practicable" taking into account a range of factors; and the right to 
establish and maintain, subject to various qualifications, independent educational 
institutions.  
4  This tension manifests itself in steep disparities in educational access and resources 
between schools in formerly white and black areas. See Spaull 2012 Poverty and 
Privilege.  
5  Woolman describes school governing bodies as emergent institutions for flexible, 
reflexive and experimental decision-making. As such, they promote local forms of 
participatory democracy. Woolman The Selfless Constitution 338 – 348. 
6  Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC). 
7  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC). 
8  MEC for Education v Governing Body of the Rivonia Primary School 2013 6 SA 582 
(CC). The Rivonia Primary School judgment was handed down by the Constitutional 
Court just under 3 months after the Welkom High School judgment.  
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Primary School) had their origin in challenges brought by school governing 
bodies to interventions by provincial heads of education departments in the 
language, pregnancy and admission policies adopted by the respective 
governing bodies. The Constitutional Court emphasised the importance of 
engagement and cooperation between the parties as a constitutionally 
required approach to resolving these disputes.9 In these contexts, 
meaningful engagement holds promise as an innovative remedial response 
to constitutional infringements of the educational rights in section 29 of the 
Constitution and related rights in the Bill of Rights.10 However, the role of 
engagement at the remedial stage of these cases raises a number of 
questions regarding its alignment with the norms of public law remedial 
decision-making.  
Susan Sturm has developed a sophisticated framework for assessing 
participatory remedies in the light of general principles applicable to public 
law remedies.11 Drawing on her framework, this article aims to evaluate 
meaningful engagement as a constitutional remedy in the context of the 
education rights cases referred to above. It commences by identifying a set 
of normative principles appropriate to evaluating participatory remedies 
such as meaningful engagement. It thereafter proceeds to analyse and 
evaluate the role which engagement has played in the three Constitutional 
Court judgments referred to above in the light of these remedial principles. 
The article concludes by making proposals for the development of 
meaningful engagement as a participatory remedy in educational rights 
disputes. These proposals seek to ensure a better alignment between the 
meaningful engagement remedy and the public law remedial principles 
discussed in part 2.  
  
                                            
9  Meaningful engagement was pioneered in eviction disputes implicating the housing 
rights in section 26 of the Constitution. See, for example:  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, 
Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 
SA 208 (CC); Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 
2010 3 SA 454 (CC); Schubart Park Residents Association v City of Tshwane 
Metropolitan Municipality 2013 1 SA 323 (CC); Pheko v Ekhurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality 2012 2 SA 598 (CC).  
10  The other rights affected in these disputes have primarily entailed the right against 
unfair discrimination (s 9(3)), the right to just administrative action (s 33), and the 
principle of the best interests of the child (s 28(2)). 
11  Sturm 1991 The Georgetown LJ 1355. 
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2 Evaluative principles for constitutional remedies 
The courts' power to grant remedies for infringements of constitutional rights 
are set out in sections 38 and 172(1) of the Constitution. The former 
provision gives a court the power to grant "appropriate relief, including a 
declaration of rights". The latter provision requires a court to "declare that 
any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution, is invalid to the 
extent of its inconsistency"12 and permits it to grant "any order that is just 
and equitable."13 The central consideration for courts in crafting remedies 
for constitutional rights violations is to ensure the effective vindication and 
protection of the right violated. As the Constitutional Court has emphasised, 
this is important not only to the immediate victims of the relevant rights 
violations, but also to others similarly affected.14 In contrast to traditional 
private law remedies, the broader public interest is also a highly relevant 
factor in devising remedies to redress constitutional rights violations. The 
South African public has an interest in the effective protection of 
constitutional rights, which are fundamental to the fabric of our post-1994 
constitutional democracy.15 
Susan Sturm has argued for the need for a distinctive normative theory of 
public law remedies precisely because their effective vindication involves 
considerations, information and processes different from those involved in 
the merits or liability stage of litigation. The gap between right and remedy 
in constitutional litigation is frequently broad, because a determination that 
a right is infringed does not dictate the form of the remedy. This is 
particularly so when the rights violation stems from systemic institutional or 
organisational failures. Although commonly associated with socio-economic 
rights cases, such failures lie at the heart of all complex, polycentric 
constitutional rights cases. More often than not, there will be no one obvious 
remedial solution for remedying a constitutional violation of this nature, and 
                                            
12  Section 172(1)(a). 
13  Section 172(1)(b). This provision specifies that just and equitable remedies include an 
order limiting the retrospective effect of an invalidity order, and a suspended 
declaration of invalidity. For the broad range of just and equitable remedies available 
to the courts, see Bishop "Remedies" ch 9, 151 – 196; Liebenberg Socio-Economic 
Rights 397 – 450.  
14  Thus a court should in principle be prepared to grant any remedy for a constitutional 
rights violation that it awards to the individual party before it to all similarly affected 
parties: "[T]he litigants before the Court should not be singled out for the grant of relief, 
but relief should be afforded to all people who are in the same situation as the litigants." 
S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1996 1 SA 388 (CC), para 32. 
15  In the words of Justice Ackermann in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 
v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 (CC), the "bells toll for everyone" when 
constitutional rights such as equality and non-discrimination are infringed (at para 82). 
Also see Hoffman v South African Airways 2001 1 SA 1 (CC), paras 42 – 43. 
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to "strike effectively at its source"16 will require processes of institutional 
reforms adopted over a period of time.  
The structural remedies17 required to achieve such reforms depend on the 
participation of a broad range of organisations, institutions and 
stakeholders, some of whom may not have been represented at the merits 
stage of the litigation.18 As Sturm notes, "[t]he remedy may also affect the 
lives of individuals or groups who have no legal entitlement concerning the 
remedy but are in a position to block or disrupt its implementation."19 
Incorporating a participatory dimension in constitutional remedies in this 
context thus make an important contribution to their effectiveness.  
Sturm argues that the traditional binary, adversarial litigation process is not 
well suited to remedying structural constitutional rights violations. She 
accordingly develops an alternative model of participatory, deliberative 
public remedial decision-making.20 The latter classes of remedy resonate 
with the meaningful engagement remedy of the Constitutional Court, 
particularly in its judgment in the Olivia Road case.21 Moreover, many of the 
principles articulated by Sturm for evaluating public law remedies are 
consonant with South African constitutional remedial jurisprudence as well 
as with widely accepted principles of legitimate remedial decision-making. 
Drawing on Sturm's analysis I proceed to identify four principles for 
evaluating the role that meaningful engagement has played in the remedial 
phase of the three educational rights judgments referred to above. These 
principles are:  
1) fair participation;  
2) substantive judicial reasoning;  
                                            
16  Fose, para 96 (per Kriegler J). 
17  On structural remedies, see Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights 165 – 225; 
Bishop "Remedies" ch 9, 175 – 196; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 424 – 438. 
18  Sturm 1991 The Georgetown LJ 1360-1365.  
19  Sturm 1991 The Georgetown LJ 1364 – 1365.  
20  See particularly Sturm 1991 The Georgetown LJ 1409 – 1446 where she makes the 
case for a distinctive deliberative model of remedial decision-making. For an analysis 
of the other models of structural remedies discussed by Sturm, see Mbazira Litigating 
Socio-Economic Rights 183 – 192. 
21  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v 
City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC). For analyses of the engagement remedy 
in Olivia Road, see Liebenberg 2012 AHRLJ 14 – 20; Chenwi "Democratizing the 
Socio-economic Rights-Enforcement Process" 185 – 188.  
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3) a "demonstrable relationship"22 between the constitutional 
infringement found at the merits stage and the remedy imposed by 
the court; and  
4) respect for the separation of powers doctrine.  
2.1 Full and fair participation 
The principle of full and fair participation aims to ensure that all parties to 
the litigation as well as those with a substantial interest in the outcome of 
the litigation23 have an opportunity to participate in the remedial process. In 
addition to the participation of the parties and those substantially affected 
by the rights violation, the principle of ensuring an effective remedy 
suggests that a court should structure the remedial process in such a 
manner as to enable the participation of individuals, groups and 
organisations that are able to facilitate or block the implementation of the 
remedy.24  
Sturm describes the broader role of participation at the remedial stage of 
decision-making as being to promote cooperation amongst the different 
actors that must live by the plan.25 Related objectives of participatory 
processes include the "integrative function" [of] defining the community that 
is responsible for implementing the remedy,26 and the "educative function" 
of acquiring the information and developing the negotiation skills required 
to reform complex institutions and organisations.27  
Ensuring that the participation process is fair requires measures to ensure 
that representatives of groups or organisations involved in the deliberations 
are representative of and accountable to the constituencies they 
represent.28 It also requires the establishment of mechanisms to mitigate as 
                                            
22  Sturm 1991 The Georgetown LJ 1408. 
23  Parties with a direct and substantial interest in the decision and remedy should be 
formally joined to the litigation. Thus, for example, local authorities are necessary 
parties to the eviction of occupiers from their homes given their broader constitutional 
and statutory obligations in terms of s 26 of the Constitution read with legislation such 
as the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 
1998, the Housing Act 107 of 1997, and the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. For a 
recent application, see Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2015 5 SA 600 
(CC) paras 56 – 60.  See Muller and Liebenberg 2013 SAJHR 554. 
24  Sturm 1991 The Georgetown LJ 1410. 
25  Sturm 1991 The Georgetown LJ 1391 – 1392. 
26  Sturm 1991 The Georgetown LJ 1393. 
27  Sturm 1991 The Georgetown LJ 1394. 
28  Sturm 1991 The Georgetown LJ 1410. 
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far as possible the unequal power relations arising from differential access 
to resources, information and skills.29 As Sturm observes:  
The plaintiffs frequently are poor, politically powerless, and unorganized, and 
thus may be less able to influence the remedial decision. Yet, the values 
served by participation at the remedial stage depend on some direct 
involvement of those who must live with the results. An important criteria of 
remedial participation, therefore, is the capability of a particular form of 
remedial practice to control for unequal power, resources and sophistication.30  
2.2  Substantive reasoning in remedial decision-making 
Transparent, substantive judicial reasoning is not only critical to the 
legitimacy of judicial decision-making, but is also integral to the ethos of 
South Africa's transformative constitution.31 It gives effect in the context of 
adjudicatory decision-making to the "culture of justification,"32 which should 
pervade all exercises of power under our constitutional order, including 
judicial power. As Justice O'Regan observes: 
A constitutional order requiring openness and accountability in relation to the 
exercise of public power cannot tolerate judicial avoidance of reasoning on 
fundamental constitutional values.33 
The commitment to substantive reasoning should apply with equal force to 
both the merits and remedial phases of constitutional adjudication. In the 
remedial context, such reasoning would include, for example, elaborating 
on how the proposed remedy is related to the infringement of constitutional 
rights found at the merits stage,34 as well as a justification for the particular 
choice of remedy amongst the range of available remedial options.  
It has been questioned whether participatory remedies (which attempt to 
stimulate agreement amongst the parties on the measures required to 
redress rights violations) are consistent with the principles of substantive 
judicial reasoning and the courts' interpretative responsibilities. Thus Owen 
Fiss has argued that reliance on party negotiation and agreement in the 
remedial process may tempt courts into abdicating their responsibilities "to 
explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such 
as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality 
into accord with them."35 Whilst he acknowledges that parties cannot be 
                                            
29 Sturm 1991 The Georgetown LJ 1410.  
30 Sturm 1991 The Georgetown LJ 1396 (footnotes omitted). 
31 Froneman 2005 Stell LR 3-20.  
32 Mureinik 1994 SAJHR 32. 
33 O’Regan 2008 Acta Juridica 16. 
34 This aspect is elaborated upon in part 2.3 below.  
35 Fiss 1984Yale LJ 1085. 
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forced to litigate, he draws attention to the public interest dimension of 
constitutional rights enforcement, which may be sacrificed when parties 
settle for peace instead of pursuing justice.36 Fiss reminds us that the 
effective redress of human rights has a broader public dimension beyond 
the interests of the immediate parties to the dispute.  
Sturm contests the view that participatory remedial processes are 
incompatible with the responsibility of the judiciary for ensuring that 
constitutional rights and values receive reasoned explication and vindication 
in litigation. She points out that adversarial legal processes are not the only 
way of ensuring substantive reasoning in the remedial process of 
adjudication.37 This is particularly the case when the vindication of a 
constitutional norm can be achieved through a broad range of means, and 
the presiding judge is not as well placed as the parties and other 
stakeholders to determine how best to remedy the rights violation.38 In these 
contexts, Sturm argues that it is possible for a judge to enforce a fair 
deliberative process at the remedial stage of litigation whilst holding the 
parties accountable to substantively interpreted constitutional norms.39 In 
this regard, Sturm highlights the distinct judicial roles and objectives 
applicable at the merits and remedial stages of public litigation. In evaluating 
the engagement jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court in part 3 below, I 
consider how judicial responsibility for ensuring that the remedy gives effect 
to substantively reasoned constitutional norms may be preserved.  
2.3 A "demonstrable relationship" between right and remedy 
Closely related to the previous principle of reasoned remedial decision-
making is a demonstrable relationship between the remedial order and the 
substantive right found to be infringed at the merits stage of constitutional 
adjudication. Failure to adhere to this principle renders judges vulnerable to 
accusations of abusing their coercive authority and failing to give parties 
and those affected a proper opportunity to be heard on the remedial solution 
imposed by the court.40  
Again this is not an inevitable by-product of participatory remedial 
processes. It does caution, however, that such remedies should be 
structured so as to ensure that their relationship with the underlying 
                                            
36 Fiss 1984Yale LJ 1085. 
37 Sturm 1991 The Georgetown LJ 1401. 
38 Sturm 1991 The Georgetown LJ 1402. 
39 Sturm 1991 The Georgetown LJ 1427 – 1444. 
40 Sturm 1991 The Georgetown LJ 1408 - 1409. 
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constitutional norms that have been found to have been breached can be 
demonstrated. In addition, it cautions courts to ensure that all parties 
affected by the constitutional breach have been given a proper opportunity 
to be heard in relation to the proposed remedy. Finally, a transparent, 
substantively reasoned connection between the rights found to be breached 
at the merits stage of the judgment and the remedial order provides the 
court with a set of normative criteria for evaluating the outcomes of the 
participatory remedial process.  
2.4 Respect for the separation of powers doctrine  
Respect for the separation of powers doctrine is a principle which applies 
not only in the exercise of a court's constitutional review powers, but also in 
the remedial phase of a case.41 In the remedial context, the doctrine 
requires that courts fulfil their responsibility under the South African 
Constitution for crafting effective remedies for infringements of 
constitutional rights.42 This responsibility arises from the principle of 
constitutional supremacy in section 2 of the Constitution,43 combined with 
the remedial obligations of the courts in terms of sections 38 and 172(1).44  
However, in exercising these powers, separation of powers considerations 
caution courts to avoid usurping the legislative, executive or administrative 
functions of the coordinate branches of government. The legislature and 
executive enjoy greater democratic legitimacy as well as institutional 
capability in exercising these functions. Respect for the roles and functions 
of the legislature and executive as well as those of administrative bodies 
and organs of state constitutes the second significant separation of powers 
principle in a remedial context.45  
                                            
41  On the role of the separation of powers in remedial decision-making in South African 
constitutional law, see: DPP, Transvaal v Minister for Justice and Constitutional 
Development 2009 4 SA 222 (CC) paras 183 – 184; National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs & Others 2000 2 SA 1 (CC), paras 66, 74 
- 76; Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No. 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) 
paras 98 – 99. On the application of the doctrine in the context of remedial decision-
making in US public law, see Sturm 1991 The Georgetown LJ 1403 – 1406. 
42  AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings v CEO, SA Social Security Agency (No 2) 
2014 4 SA 179 (CC) paras 42 – 46. 
43  Section 2 of the Constitution reads: "The Constitution is the supreme law of the 
Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by 
it must be fulfilled."  
44  See ftns 12 and 13 above and the accompanying text.  
45  For an account of the links between the doctrine of separation of powers and notions 
of judicial deference in South African public law, see Hoexter Administrative Law in 
South Africa 137-155. 
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Reconciling the two principles of the separation of powers doctrine outlined 
above in the context of enforcing the positive duties imposed by rights in the 
Bill of Rights presents particular challenges for the judiciary. On the one 
hand, the courts must craft remedies that will provide effective relief for 
constitutional rights violations. On the other hand, they must avoid undue 
intrusions in the policy-making discretion of the relevant organs of state and 
afford them an appropriate latitude of policy choice and flexibility consistent 
with their mandate to govern effectively in the public interest.46  
Meaningful engagement-style remedies offer a promising vehicle for 
reconciling these two principles. These remedies aim to stimulate 
participatory agreement on the precise policy measures required to remedy 
the rights violation identified by the courts at the merits stage. The court 
explicitly refrains from prescribing specific policy solutions to the parties, but 
instead requires them to work out, through deliberative engagement, a 
detailed plan of action to give effect to the court's merits findings. Organs of 
state are accorded a broad discretion to work out, in partnership with rights 
beneficiaries and stakeholders, the policy measures required to remedy the 
rights violation. Participatory, engagement-style remedies thus represent a 
departure from a traditional "command and control" style of judicial 
remedy.47 Their primary objective is to stimulate the responsible organs of 
state to engage the rights beneficiaries, experts and other stakeholders to 
design an effective remedial plan of action. 
However, the principle of ultimate judicial responsibility for ensuring an 
effective remedy implies that the court should retain supervisory jurisdiction 
so as to ensure that the agreed plan of action is consistent with the court's 
interpretation of the relevant rights at the merits stage. Without this 
                                            
46  See, for example, the margin for policy adaptation allowed by the Court in respect of 
the mandatory orders it granted in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 
(No. 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) paras 114 and 127 read with Order No. 4, para 135. In 
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe [2015] 2 All SA 251 (SCA), 
the SCA overturned a broad-ranging reporting order against the City by Satchwell J in 
the court a quo requiring a report on the steps the City was taking to secure alternative 
accommodation for all those facing homelessness as a result of the eviction of 
unlawful occupiers in Johannesburg. The SCA held that this aspect of the lower court’s 
order transcended the issues in dispute and amounted to directing the City on how to 
comply with its obligations to provide temporary accommodation to homeless persons 
in general. According to the Court the form of the particular reporting order in the 
circumstances of the case infringed the principle of the separation of powers, and 
could not stand (paras 27 – 28). 
47  In this respect, it resembles the role of the courts envisaged in the democratic 
experimentalist legal literature. See Dorf and Sabel 1998 Columbia LR 267 – 473; 
Liebenberg and Young "Adjudicating Social and Economic Rights: Can Democratic 
Experimentalism Help?" 237 – 257. 
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supervisory element, participatory remedies run the risk of degenerating into 
privatised dispute-settlement.48 This would be contrary to the constitutional 
obligations of the courts to interpret and enforce fundamental rights.  
The engagement process between the parties should be structured and 
guided by the substantive normative interpretation by the court of the 
relevant rights at the merits stage, and all elements of the remedial plan 
must be justifiable in terms of this interpretation. A well-structured remedial 
process should further generate a detailed record of the deliberations and 
how they relate to the merits judgment. This record can be of great 
assistance to the court in assessing the adequacy of the parties' agreed 
programme for remedying the rights violation.49  
2.5  Remedial principles: Summation 
The abovementioned principles provide a basis for evaluating participatory 
remedies, particularly in complex, polycentric cases involving a range of 
stakeholders. These kinds of cases call for a departure from the traditional 
model of binary (between two parties), adversarial, once-and-for-all 
remedies. The remedial principles discussed in this part seek to satisfy the 
demands of remedial efficacy as well as key features of legitimate judicial 
decision-making in constitutional democracies.50  
In the following part, I analyse the role that meaningful engagement has 
played in three Constitutional Court education rights judgements, and 
evaluate this role in the light of the remedial principles discussed. All three 
cases unfolded against the backdrop of the complex, systemic problems 
besetting the education system in post-apartheid South Africa. As argued 
above, it is precisely this type of case which calls for innovative participatory 
remedies.  
  
                                            
48  For an extended argument against a dispute settlement approach to constitutional 
rights infringements, see Fiss 1984Yale LJ 1073 – 1090. 
49  Sturm 1991 The Georgetown LJ 1435. 
50  According to Sturm: "A legitimate model is one that takes each of these norms into 
account, strives to satisfy all of them, and strikes an appropriate balance amongst 
them given the demands and constraints of the particular remedial problem before the 
court" 1991 The Georgetown LJ 1410 – 1411. 
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3. Evaluating meaningful engagement in education rights 
cases 
3.1  Determining a school's language policy: Hoërskool Ermelo 
3.1.1  Analysis 
The case came before the Constitutional Court on appeal by the Head of 
the Mpumalanga (provincial) Department of Education ("HOD") against a 
judgment of the Supreme Court that it had acted unlawfully in revoking the 
function of the Hoërskool Ermelo public school to determine the language 
policy of the school and in conferring the function upon an interim committee 
appointed by him. The Supreme Court had set aside the intervention by the 
Head of Department as well as the decisions of the interim committee to 
amend the language policy of the school from Afrikaans single medium to 
English and Afrikaans parallel medium.51 
Underlying the dispute concerning government's powers to intervene in 
school governance was the excess classroom and learner capacity of 
Hoërskool Ermelo.52 In comparison, schools in the school circuit of Ermelo 
catering primarily to African pupils had much higher learner-to-teacher ratios 
due to a shortage of classrooms and high enrolment numbers.53 As 
Moseneke DCJ noted in his judgment for a unanimous court, these realities 
illustrate the vast disparities in educational resources and the quality of 
education - a direct historical legacy of apartheid.54 Educational inequality 
has profound social consequences as it "entrenches historical inequity as it 
perpetuates socio-economic disadvantage."55  
This situation came to a head when the Department sought to require the 
school in the 2007 new school year to admit grade 8 learners who could not 
be accommodated at any of the English medium schools in Ermelo because 
they were already full to capacity.56 The school adopted the stance that the 
                                            
51  Hoërskool Ermelo v Head, Department of Education, Mpumalanga 2009 3 SA 422 
(SCA). 
52  The schools’ learner-to-classroom ratio was 23:1 in comparison with the national 
average of 35:1. See Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 
2 SA 415 (CC) paras 7 – 10 read with paras 15 and 20.  
53  See Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) 
para 11. 
54  Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) para 
2. 
55  Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) para 
2.  
56  For a detailed account of the development of the dispute, see Mpumalanga 
Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) paras 12 – 20. 
S LIEBENBERG PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  13 
learners would be eligible for admission only if they agreed to be taught in 
Afrikaans. An impasse developed, as the school refused to accede to the 
Department's demand to change its language policy to parallel medium in 
order to accommodate the 113 stranded learners unable to gain admission 
to a school.57 The HOD responded by purporting to withdraw with immediate 
effect the function of the school governing body to determine the school's 
language policy, and by appointing an interim committee for three months 
in order to perform the function of determining the school's language policy. 
The objective of the appointment of the interim committee was to change 
the language policy to include English as a medium of instruction so as to 
facilitate the admission of the learners who wished to be taught in English.58 
In this regard, the HOD purported to act in terms of sections 22(1) and (3) 
and 25(1) of the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996 (hereafter the 
"Schools Act").59 The Constitutional Court noted that it was common cause 
that this new language policy was adopted without consultation with relevant 
stakeholders such as the school governing body, the teaching staff, the 
learners already admitted to the school, or their parents.60  
The Constitutional Court held that the Supreme Court of Appeal had erred 
in finding that the HOD had no power under section 22(1) and (3) of the 
Schools Act to withdraw the power of the school governing body to 
determine a school's language policy.61 If "reasonable grounds" exist62 and 
the procedural fairness requirements of s 22(3) are followed,63 the 
department's power to withdraw a function of a governing body extends also 
to the language policy of a school. The Court held that the conclusion was 
supported by a holistic construction of section 29 and the Schools Act, which 
requires that school language policies be designed so as to take into 
account the complex relationship between education in the language of 
one's choice, access to basic education by all children, the duty not to 
discriminate unfairly against any learners in admission to schools, and the 
                                            
57  Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) paras 
17 – 18.  
58  Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) paras 
21 – 23, 25 – 26. 
59  Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) para 
21. 
60  Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) para 
27.  
61  Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) paras 
63 – 81. 
62  Section 22(1) of the Schools Act. The factors informing the assessment of 
reasonableness are set out by the Court in para 74.  
63  Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) para 
75. 
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imperatives of historical redress and transformation in the schooling system 
as a whole.64 Whilst governing bodies are intended to function as "beacons 
of grassroots democracy",65 the Court cautioned against a school’s being 
governed "as a static and insular entity". A school is "a public resource 
which must be managed not only in the interests of those who happen to be 
learners and parents at the time but also in the interests of the broader 
community in which the school is located and in the light of the values of our 
constitution."66  
However, the Court held that the HOD had acted unlawfully by invoking 
section 25 of the School's Act to appoint an interim committee to determine 
the school's language policy.67 This had also "contaminated" its recourse to 
section 22 of the Schools Act.68 Even if the appointment had been lawful, 
the Court held that the manner of its appointment and the way it proceeded 
to determine the new language policy did not satisfy the prescripts of 
procedural fairness.69  
According to a traditional remedial approach, the finding of unlawfulness 
and the dismissal of the HOD's appeal70 should have been the end of the 
case. The situation of the individual Grade 8 learners who had been enrolled 
in the school since January 2007 in terms of the parallel medium policy had 
been resolved by an agreed order between the parties. This order (which 
                                            
64  Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) paras 
76 – 78. 
65  Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) 57 
and 79. 
66  Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) para 
80. 
67  Section 25(1) of the Schools Act empowers the HoD to appoint persons to perform the 
functions of a governing body which he or she determines on reasonable grounds has 
ceased or failed to perform the functions allocated to it in terms of the School’s Act. In 
casu, there were no grounds for concluding that the governing body of Hoërskool 
Ermelo had ceased to perform any function or failed to adopt a language policy. 
Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) para 
86. 
68  Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) para 
89.  
69  Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) para 
92. 
70  As noted above, the Constitutional Court overruled the SCA in respect of the power of 
an HOD to withdraw the function of a governing body to determine the language policy 
of a school in terms of s 6(2) of the Schools Act provided that the requirements of s 
22 were satisfied.  
S LIEBENBERG PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  15 
the Court affirmed) permitted the particular learners to continue to be taught 
and write exams in English until the end of their school careers.71  
However, the Court held that the facts of the case called for the making of 
further just and equitable orders. The Court derived the power to make just 
and equitable orders from section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution, which it held 
did not depend on a finding of the constitutionality of legislation or conduct 
in terms of section 172(1)(a).72 Moseneke DCJ held as follows: 
This ample and flexible remedial jurisdiction in constitutional disputes permits 
a court to forge an order that would place substance above mere form by 
identifying the actual underlying dispute between the parties and by requiring 
the parties to take steps directed at resolving the dispute in a manner 
consistent with constitutional requirements. In several cases, this Court has 
found it fair to fashion orders to facilitate a substantive resolution of the 
underlying dispute between the parties. Sometimes orders of this class have 
taken the form of structural interdicts or supervisory orders. This approach is 
valuable and it advances constitutional justice particularly by ensuring that the 
parties themselves become part of the solution.73 
The Court held that it was just and equitable "to all concerned" to direct the 
school governing body to reconsider and determine the school's language 
policy in the light of the considerations articulated in the judgment. The 
Court suggested that the school governing body would need to give serious 
consideration to adapting its language policy to cater for these learners, 
given its dwindling enrolment numbers and the need to redress the unequal 
access to education perpetuated by the current Afrikaans-only language 
policy.74 
It noted that the underlying problem in the Ermelo school district was the 
shortage of classroom places for learners who choose English as their 
language of instruction. This situation was clearly a structural one relating 
to the legacy of disadvantage affecting mainly schools in the former black 
group areas. Without concerted action, the problem of the shortage of 
classroom places for black learners choosing to be educated in English in 
future was likely to persist, and securing additional places at Hoërskool 
Ermelo would afford only a partial alleviation of this problem. The 
Department of Education bore constitutional and statutory duties to provide 
                                            
71  Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) para 
95. 
72  Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) para 
97. 
73  Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) para 
97 (footnotes omitted). 
74  Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) para 
100. 
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basic education in an official language of choice to everyone, where it was 
reasonably practical and just to do so. The Court was not satisfied that the 
Department had taken the necessary "proactive and timely steps"75 to 
secure sufficient Grade 8 English school places and to alleviate the high 
level of overcrowding in the Ermelo district high schools.  
In the light of these considerations, after dismissing the appeal, the Court 
made further ancillary orders. The first order required the Hoërskool Ermelo 
School Governing Body to review and determine a language policy in terms 
of section 6(2) of the Schools Act and the Constitution, and to report back 
to the Court within 3 months on the process that had been followed to review 
its language policy, and attaching a copy of the language policy. Secondly, 
the Head of the Mpumalanga Department of Education was also ordered to 
lodge a report with the court within 3 months "setting out the likely demand 
for grade 8 English places at the start of the school year in 2010 and setting 
out the steps the Department has taken to satisfy this likely demand for an 
English or parallel medium high school in the circuit of Ermelo."76  
3.1.2  Evaluation 
Although not expressly invoking the concept of meaningful engagement, the 
spirit of the judgment and supervisory orders envisages participatory 
processes. This is implicit in the requirement that in revising its language 
policy in accordance with the Constitution and relevant legislation, the 
school governing body should take into account not only the existing school 
community but also the broader needs of the community in which the school 
was located. Furthermore, the provincial education department would have 
to embark on an information-gathering and broad consultative process in 
order to comply with the supervisory order requiring it to plan and report on 
the steps it was taking to satisfy the likely demand for grade 8 English places 
in the new school year.  
These ancillary supervisory orders were made by the court in recognition of 
the underlying structural problems of educational access and quality in the 
Ermelo school district. An effective, sustainable solution to these structural 
problems required a broad-based participatory process for the reasons 
                                            
75  Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) para 
103. 
76  Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) para 
106. In its judgment the Court held that the report provided by the Department "must 
also provide information and statistics on the levels of enrolment in other high schools 
in the area in the light of the learner-to-class ration norms set by the Minister of 
Education." (para 104). 
S LIEBENBERG PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  17 
given by Sturm: garnering the requisite information from stakeholders; 
resolving differences through fair deliberative processes; and fostering 
broad "buy-in" to the proposed policy and programmatic solutions.77  
However, the judgment and relevant supervisory orders could have been 
more explicit regarding the requirement that the governing body and 
department engage meaningfully both with each other and other 
stakeholders with a substantial interest in educational rights in the Ermelo 
district. This would have clarified that the policy and planning processes 
envisaged in the orders should occur through a participatory process 
involving all individuals, organisations and institutions whose input was 
necessary to ensuring that the objectives of the supervisory orders were 
met. As Sturm observes, the deliberative public law remedial model requires 
an assessment "of the individuals and organizations whose participation in 
the remedial stage is necessary to developing and implementing a fair and 
workable remedy."78 This may include the recruitment of parties at the 
remedial stage who were not involved at the liability stage.79 In terms of the 
deliberative remedial model, the parties are also invited to consider how the 
participatory process could be structured so as to ensure fair participation 
by all relevant stakeholders. A more explicit incorporation of meaningful 
engagement in the remedial orders handed down in the Hoërskool Ermelo 
case would have given effect to the first remedial principle of fair 
participation discussed above.80  
The second criticism that could be levelled against the remedial orders in 
Hoërskool Ermelo is the lack of a demonstrable relationship between the 
findings at the merits stage of the judgment and the remedial orders. This 
implicates the third remedial principle discussed above.81 As noted above, 
the narrow issue before the Court was the legality of the HOD's intervention, 
which was found to be in contravention of relevant provisions of the Schools 
Act. The HOD's appeal was accordingly dismissed (albeit on grounds 
different from those in the SCA's judgment). The decision by the Court to 
                                            
77  See the quotation in the text accompanying ftn 73 above.  
78  Sturm 1991 The Georgetown LJ 1429. 
79  Sturm identifies four possible procedural mechanisms for enabling the participation of 
actors who were not involved in the liability phase of the litigation (at 1429, ftn 395). 
All these mechanisms would in principle be capable of being applied or developed in 
terms of a constitutionally-directed development of the South African rules of civil 
procedure. In the context of the Hoërskool Ermelo case, relevant stakeholders that 
could have been invited to participate in the remedial process are other school 
governing bodies in the Ermelo district, parent organisations, NGOs focusing on 
educational rights, and the South African Human Rights Commission.  
80  See part 2.1 above. 
81  See part 2.3 above. 
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make the further ancillary orders referred to above was based on the need 
both to resolve the underlying disputes between the parties by requiring the 
adoption of a constitutionally compliant language policy by the school, and 
for the Department to take proactive steps to secure sufficient English 
school places. As discussed above, the underlying purpose of ensuring a 
demonstrable relationship between constitutional breach and remedy is to 
safeguard the legitimacy of judicial orders, ensure fairness to the parties, 
and provide a transparent normative standard against which to test the 
outcomes of a participatory remedial process. Arguably the underlying 
disputes which informed the ancillary orders were sufficiently closely 
connected to the legality dispute and had been adequately canvassed in the 
legal proceedings in three courts. The Court elaborated in some detail in its 
judgment the principles which governing bodies should take into account in 
formulating a language policy which is consistent with the provisions of 
section 29(2) of the Constitution.82 Arguably there was therefore sufficient 
normative guidance provided in the judgment both to the Hoërskool Ermelo 
Governing Body and to other governing bodies in South Africa on the 
formulation of constitutionally compliant school language policies.  
However, similar elaboration was not provided in the main judgment on the 
nature of the positive duties of the Department of Education to take 
"proactive and timely" steps to ensure sufficient school places for learners 
choosing English as their language of instruction. Such measures would 
entail a complex interaction and reconciliation of the duties imposed by 
sections 29(1)(a) and (2) respectively.83 The Department would need to 
engage in a procedurally fair manner with Afrikaans single-medium schools 
with excess capacity in an attempt to persuade them to adapt their language 
policy to accommodate learners who chose instruction in English. At the 
same time, it would have to procure additional resources so as to construct 
                                            
82  Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 (CC) paras 
45 – 54; paras 75 – 81; 99 – 100. 
83  In Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay NO 2011 8 BCLR 761 
(CC), the Constitutional Court implied that the concept of "basic education" in section 
29(1)(a) corresponds with the period of compulsory schooling prescribed in section 
3(1) of the Schools Act (para 38). Compulsory school attendance in terms of the latter 
provision extends to learners from the age of seven years until the age of 15 years or 
until the learner reaches the ninth grade, whichever occurs first. On this interpretation, 
the duty to secure sufficient placement for grade 8 learners would fall within the scope 
of the unqualified right to basic education in s 29(1)(a). In terms of section 3(3) of the 
Act, the MEC is required to ensure that there are enough school places so that every 
child who lives in his or her province can attend school as required by section 3(1). 
Also see Minister of Basic Education v Basic Education for All [2015] ZASCA 198 
paras 35 – 38. Academic literature supports a broad, functional interpretation of the 
right to basic education, see  Simbo 2012 LDD 162 – 184; McConnachie and 
McConnachie 2012 SALJ 565 – 568; Murungi 2015 PER 3160 – 3195. 
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and establish one or more new English or parallel medium high schools. 
Scant guidance was provided in the judgment on the constitutional 
normative principles which would have to guide the Department in fulfilling 
its responsibilities in term of section 29.84 Given that these issues are also 
of significant public importance to both public educational authorities and all 
involved in education in South Africa, one would have expected greater 
elaboration on the obligations of the Department in terms of section 29(1) 
read with (2) of the Constitution.  
The third point of criticism is that no further judgment was delivered by the 
Constitutional Court after issuing its supervisory orders. It is therefore 
unclear if the Court was satisfied that the content of the reports filed 
reflected adequate compliance with the constitutional principles outlined in 
its judgment. The supervisory orders issued by the Court demonstrate 
respect for the separation of powers doctrine by requiring the relevant 
organs of state to work out the details of the relevant educational policy and 
plans to give effect to the constitutional principles articulated in the 
judgment.85 However, the absence of any follow-up judgment assessing 
whether or not the reports of the parties evinced a satisfactory compliance 
with the initial judgment raises the question whether the Court fulfilled its 
own constitutional responsibility to ensure effective relief for the underlying 
constitutional issues identified in its judgment.86 This also implicates the 
fourth remedial principle concerning the separation of powers.  
Moreover, a judgment by the court pertaining to the outcome of the 
supervisory orders issued by it would have given effect to the third principle 
concerning substantive judicial reasoning at the remedial stage of 
adjudication.87 Such a judgment could have provided guidance to all organs 
of state and stakeholders involved in the implementation of constitutional 
                                            
84  See, for example, the broad observations made at paras 100 – 104. 
85  See the fourth remedial principle discussed in part 2.4 above.  
86  The Constitutional Court has on a number of occasions delivered subsequent 
judgments dealing with various aspects of supervisory orders made in its initial 
judgment. See, for example: Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v 
Thubelisha Homes 2011 7 BCLR 723 (CC) (discharging the eviction order in response 
to a failure by the respondents to implement the supervisory orders made in the initial 
judgment); Pheko v Ekhurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2015 5 SA 600 (CC) 
(determining whether the municipality should be held in contempt for failure to comply 
with the Court’s reporting orders and joining further parties to the proceedings for the 
purposes of implementing the relevant supervisory orders); AllPay Consolidated 
Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social 
Security Agency 2015 6 BCLR 653 (CC) (determining an application by one of the 
parties for ancillary relief to the supervisory orders made by the Court in the remedies 
judgment).  
87  See the third remedial principle discussed in part 2.3. 
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educational rights in South Africa, thereby vindicating the broader public 
interest in the remedy issued in the Hoërskool Ermelo case. 
In conclusion, the supervisory orders issued in Hoërskool Ermelo represent 
a modest but nonetheless significant attempt to stimulate the parties to seek 
a solution to the underlying constitutional issues identified in the judgment. 
However, the reasons for making these orders could have been more 
substantive, and they could have been structured to give better effect to the 
four constitutional remedial principles discussed in part 2. The fact that the 
case was presented to the courts primarily as a dispute concerning the 
legality of the MEC's intervention in the language policy of the school meant 
that the case did not lend itself to a sustained focus on the structuring of the 
participatory aspects of the supervisory orders. It is commendable, 
nevertheless, that the Constitutional Court engaged with the underlying 
structural causes of the dispute and their implications for section 29 rights. 
The nascent potential of participatory engagement remedies in the context 
of structural educational rights disputes is evident in the Hoërskool Ermelo 
judgment. This remedy was developed further in another major 
Constitutional Court case concerning the impact of school governance 
policies on constitutional rights, the Welkom High School case. 
3.2  School pregnancy policies: The Welkom High School  
3.2.1  Analysis 
Meaningful engagement featured prominently in an education rights context 
in the Welkom High School case.88 As with the Hoërskool Ermelo case, the 
legal dispute in Welkom High School was framed as a power struggle 
regarding who had the ultimate say over the formulation and implementation 
of school policies, specifically learner pregnancy policies in terms of which 
                                            
88  Meaningful engagement previously featured as an element of the provisional orders 
made by the Constitutional Court in the case of Governing Body of the Juma Musjid 
Primary School v Essay NO 2011 8 BCLR 761 (CC) (see paras 74 – 78). These orders 
were made in an attempt to achieve the resolution of a dispute concerning the closure 
of a public school operating on land owned by a private trust. When the resolution 
failed, the Department was further ordered to engage with the parents of the affected 
learners to secure alternative school placements for them. The Court’s judgment 
focused on the relevant constitutional obligations of the Trust and of the Department 
of Education in the circumstances. Ultimately, the Court ordered the school to vacate 
the Trust’s premises on the basis that it was satisfied that suitable alternative 
educational placements had been found for the affected learners. As the judgment did 
not focus on the reasons for meaningful engagement in its provisional orders, it is not 
analysed in further detail. However, it constitutes another illustration of the potential of 
meaningful engagement in implementing court orders in the context of fundamental 
rights litigation. 
S LIEBENBERG PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  21 
two schools had excluded two pregnant learners from school for protracted 
periods. The impact of the relevant policies would have been to force the 
learners to repeat a school year.89 The Head of the provincial Department 
of Education (the HOD) had instructed the principals of the schools to 
readmit the two learners. In response, the relevant school governing bodies 
had sought and obtained interdictory relief in the High Court against the 
HOD, restraining interference in decisions taken by the schools in terms of 
their learner pregnancy policies. These orders were confirmed in essence 
on appeal by the HOD to the Supreme Court of Appeal.  
A further appeal by the HOD against the restraining order to the 
Constitutional Court was dismissed. Khampepe J (author of the main 
judgment for the majority) noted that the Act envisages a "partnership" 
involving the State, parents of learners and members of the community in 
which the school is located. The Schools Act closely regulates the roles and 
interactions between the parties, creating "the checks, balances and 
accountability mechanisms."90 The governing body of a school is 
responsible for adopting the necessary policies and programmes to guide 
the management of the school and to create an environment for the 
realisation of the right to education in the school. This includes the power to 
adopt a policy regulating learner pregnancies.91 No school governing body 
was permitted to adopt policies and exercise powers that were contrary to 
the fundamental rights of pregnant learners to be free from unfair 
discrimination.92 However, the School's Act did not empower the HOD to 
by-pass the school governing bodies and issue direct instructions to the 
principals of the schools contrary to the terms of the relevant policies.93 
Section 22 of the Schools Act determines the circumstances and manner in 
which a HOD could intervene directly and take over the performance of the 
particular governance or policy-formulation function of a school. 
                                            
89  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) paras 8 – 21.  
90  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 49. 
91  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) paras 57 – 70. On the specific stipulations that such a 
pregnancy policy could include, see para 64.  
92  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 71. Pregnancy, sex and gender are explicitly 
recognised as prohibited grounds of unfair discrimination in terms of s 9 of the 
Constitution read with s 1 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000, the legislation enacted to give effect to this constitutional 
right.  
93  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) paras 72 – 82. 
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Consultation with the relevant governing body on the basis of a reasonable 
belief that the HOD should take over the governing bodies' functions of 
formulating pregnancy policies was a jurisdictional pre-requisite to the 
exercise of this power in terms of section 22 of the Act.94 Alternatively, the 
HOD's remedy was to approach a court in order to have the allegedly 
unconstitutional policies set aside.95 The failure by the HOD to follow these 
procedures was contrary to the principle of legality even when he 
purportedly acted in terms of section 7(2) if the Constitution to protect the 
fundamental rights of pregnant learners.96 The State’s duty to protect rights 
in terms of section 7(2) of the Constitution did not allow available internal 
legal remedies to be ignored, nor did it countenance a resort to self-help.97 
This approach also accorded with the separation of powers doctrine, which 
requires the Executive to respect the remedies enacted by Parliament 
through "the sensitive scheme of powers" of the Schools Act.98 The majority 
of the Court therefore concluded that the schools were entitled to the 
interdictory relief granted in the lower courts.  
However, relying on reasoning similar to that in the Hoërskool Ermelo case, 
the Court held that even though the constitutionality of the relevant 
pregnancy policies was not before the Court, it would be remiss of it not to 
deal with the serious concerns regarding the constitutionality of the relevant 
policies. The legal basis for addressing the underlying constitutional 
concerns was the broad, equitable remedial discretion vested in the Court 
by section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution. The discretion to grant relief "on the 
basis of claims that were not raised (directly, fully or at all) by the parties" 
was not unlimited and had to be "exercised with caution and in a judicial 
manner, to ensure that justice is served."99 
In the present case, the Court held that it was ill-placed to make a conclusive 
determination regarding the substantive content of the policies, given that 
the respondent schools had declined to make submissions on the 
                                            
94  Section 22 of the Schools Act (cited at ftn 41 of the Welkom High School judgment.) 
Section 22(3) provides for ex post facto representations in cases of urgency.  
95  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 90, 97. 
96  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC), para 105. 
97  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 86. 
98  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 87. 
99  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) paras 107 - 109.  
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constitutionality of the policies.100 Their position was that the constitutionality 
of these policies was not properly before the Constitutional Court. 
Nevertheless, relying on section 172(1)(b), the Court proceeded to analyse 
the relevant policies and their impact on the constitutional rights of pregnant 
learners. It concluded that the policies "prima facie" violate a number of 
constitutional rights.101 These rights are the rights against unfair 
discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy and sex in terms of section 9(3); 
the right to basic education in terms of section 29; the rights to human 
dignity, privacy and bodily and psychological integrity in terms of sections 
10, 14 and 12(2) respectively; and the principle enshrined in section 28(2) 
that a child's best interests are of paramount importance in every matter 
concerning the child.102  
A key consideration in making further ancillary remedial orders in the case 
was that it was necessary to provide clarity on what the Constitution and 
Schools Act allow or do not allow in relation to the content of school 
pregnancy policies. These policies have a profound effect on the rights of 
children who were not party to these proceedings, and who may never 
independently challenge similar policies.103 Given this confusion on the 
constitutionality of the schools' pregnancy policies, the Court held that it 
would be necessary for the governing bodies and the Free State HOD "to 
engage meaningfully in order to provide clarity on this issue."104 The 
engagement order which the Court ultimately gave was also justified by 
reference to the principles of co-operative government enshrined in chapter 
3 of the Constitution and the overall scheme of the Schools Act.105  
In the light of the fact that the schools had not made submissions justifying 
the constitutionality of the policies, the Court refrained from declaring the 
policies invalid.106 After dismissing the appeal, it ordered the school 
governing bodies to review their pregnancy policies in the light of the 
                                            
100  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 110. 
101  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 112.  
102  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) paras 113 - 116. 
103  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 119. 
104  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 119. 
105  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) paras 120 -126. 
106  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 125. 
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judgment, to report back to the Court on the processes followed, and to 
furnish copies of the revised policies.107 Crucially, the Court ordered the 
schools and the Department of Education to "engage meaningfully" with 
each other in order to give effect to the orders requiring the revision of the 
policies.108 
In their separate concurring judgment, Froneman and Skwyeyiya JJ 
elaborated on the importance of co-operative governance and meaningful 
engagement in resolving disputes between the various bodies involved in 
the education system. They held that that there was a constitutional 
obligation on the partners in education to engage in good faith with each 
other on matters of education before turning to the courts.109 The Justices 
held that the emphasis on participation and engagement finds particular 
recognition in the constitutional requirements of co-operative 
government.110 A detailed analysis was conducted in the concurring 
judgment of how the parties had failed to live up to the demands of co-
operative engagement and to ensure the best interests of the learners in 
their interactions leading up to the litigation.111 The concurring judgment 
emphasised timely, structured and sustained engagement between the 
parties as "as the most powerful barrier against these types of disputes 
arising and the learners' interests being compromised in the process."112 
The duty to engage, co-operate and communicate in good faith persisted 
even in a crisis requiring immediate redress. The concurring judgment 
supported the remedial order of the main judgment, underscoring the 
                                            
107  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 128 (order 3). 
108  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 128 (order 4).  
109  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 135. 
110  Constitution, s 40. The principles of co-operative government and intergovernmental 
relations recognised by the Constitution include the duty of all spheres of government 
and all organs of state to "co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith 
by –  
(i) fostering friendly relations; 
(ii) assisting and supporting one another; 
(iii) informing one another of, and consulting one another on, matters of common 
interest; 
(iv) co-ordinating their actions and legislation with one another; 
(v) adhering to agreed procedures; and 
(vi) avoiding legal proceedings against one another." (s 41(1)(h)) 
 The Court confirmed that these duties were binding on school governing bodies and 
HODs, who were organs of State (para 141). 
111  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) paras 154 – 166. 
112  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 166. 
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importance of the school governing body and the provincial Department of 
Education adhering to the tenets of engagement described in the judgments 
in the process of reviewing the relevant pregnancy policies. In reporting 
back to the Court on progress made, it was emphasised that "the learners' 
best interests should lie at the heart of any solutions reached."113 
A dissenting judgment by Zondo J (in which three other justices concurred) 
rejected the proposition that the case should be decided on the basis of the 
principles of co-operative governance and engagement, as this point had 
not been raised by either party. Deciding the case on this basis would 
deprive the HOD of an opportunity to be heard on a central issue in deciding 
the case contrary to the principles of audi alteram partem.114 The minority 
judgment would have upheld the appeal of the HOD on the basis that he 
had both a legal obligation and the power to take active steps to protect the 
constitutional rights of pregnant learners, and to prevent the implementation 
of policies that were manifestly inconsistent with the Constitution, the 
Schools Act, and the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act.  
3.2.2  Evaluation 
The first criticism that can be levelled against the engagement order in 
Welkom High School is that it fails to give full effect to the first remedial 
principle regarding full and fair participation in the engagement process.115 
The order makes provision only for the HOD and the respondent schools to 
engage with one another. However, effective and meaningful engagement 
on school pregnancy policies requires the inputs of a broader range of 
stakeholders with experience and expertise in this area. These stakeholders 
include representatives of the directly affected rights-holders themselves – 
pregnant learners,116 the Commission for Gender Equality, the Human 
Rights Commission, representative organisations of school governing 
bodies, as well NGOs and academics specialising in gender equality, 
children's rights and the right to education. This broader stakeholder 
                                            
113  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 167. 
114  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 264. 
115  See part 2.1 above.  
116  On the significance of hearing the voice of children in decisions affecting them, see 
Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC) para 53 
(per Sachs J); For an analysis of the principles and mechanisms for promoting child 
participation in social dialogue, see Nolan Children’s Socio-Economic Rights, 
Democracy and the Courts 71 – 83; Jamieson et al (eds) South African Child Gauge 
18 – 73.  
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involvement would have contributed to more expert, broadly acceptable 
school pregnancy policies and would have facilitated the integrative and 
educative functions of engagement processes identified by Sturm.117  
In addition, through recruiting a broader range of parties to the engagement 
order, the Court could have helped ensure that the outcomes of the 
engagement order had a broader systemic impact on school pregnancy 
policies in South Africa, rather than being framed primarily in terms of 
facilitating a resolution of the dispute between the immediate parties to the 
litigation.118 This broader public dimension of the case is manifest in the 
main judgment's acknowledgment that the question of the constitutionality 
of school pregnancy policies had far-reaching effects on children who were 
not party to the proceedings.119 A more structured engagement process 
could also have provided more guidance on the basic principles that should 
inform the process of engagement to make it fair. For example, Froneman 
and Sweyiya JJ give some indications of how the duty of good faith was not 
adhered to in the interactions of the parties,120 but this aspect is not 
developed in relation to the implementation of the engagement order.  
The main and concurring judgments in Welkom High School provide a 
relatively expansive justification for the role of cooperation and engagement 
in seeking to resolve school governance disputes. Thus Khampepe J 
reasoned that cooperation and engagement are central to the partnership 
model of school governance, which is in turn a critical factor in the delivery 
of quality education. In addition to serving as a mechanism for avoiding 
public confrontation and litigation, engagement provides a structured 
process for remedying policies that raise serious constitutional concerns.121 
The concurring judgments of Froneman and Skweyiya JJ drew an even 
more explicit link between "good faith engagement" and institutional 
processes designed to give effect to constitutional rights.122 Patient, 
persistent, good faith engagement was cast in the concurring judgment not 
only as a matter of good school governance but as being essential to 
                                            
117  See the text accompanying ftn 26 – 27 above. 
118  The broader systemic role of participatory remedies is significant to avoiding the 
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the text accompanying ftn 35 – 36 above. 
119  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 119. 
120  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 164.  
121  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 125.  
122  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 139.  
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ensuring that the learners' best interests were protected.123 In this respect 
the Welkom High School judgment fares better than the Hoërskool Ermelo 
judgment in giving effect to the second remedial principle concerning 
substantively reasoned remedial decision-making.124 It explains in some 
detail why meaningful engagement is a critical vehicle for fulfilling education 
rights and remedying violations of these rights. However, as argued 
previously, this substantively reasoned justification for engagement in 
education rights disputes does not extend the actual structuring of the 
engagement process to ensure inclusive and fair participation.  
Another area in which the Welkom High School judgment is vulnerable to 
criticism is that it lacks a demonstrable relationship between the 
constitutional violation found at the merits stage and the specific remedial 
orders issued.125 The Court relied on the Hoërskool Ermelo precedent to 
depart from the narrow issues raised by the legality challenge on the basis 
that it was necessary to deal with the substantive dispute between the 
parties. In contrast to the Hoërskool Ermelo case, where the Court arguably 
did not have sufficient arguments and information before it to deal 
thoroughly with the complex issue of language and educational access, the 
constitutionality of the relevant pregnancy policies in Welkom High School 
was more straight-forward. The text of the relevant pregnancy policies and 
the manner of their application to individual pregnant learners were before 
the Court. Although school governing bodies did not have a full hearing on 
the justifiability of the policies (given their view that these policies were not 
properly before the court), a plausible justification for these manifestly 
discriminatory policies is hard to imagine. As noted above, the Court did not 
declare the policies unconstitutional, instead making the rather unusual 
finding that the relevant policies were prima facie in violation of a range of 
constitutional rights.126 On the basis of this finding, the school governing 
bodies were ordered to revise the policies taking into account the 
interpretation of constitutional rights and guidance provided in the judgment 
and through a process of engagement with the Department of Education. It 
is arguable in the circumstances that a sufficient link was established 
between the remedial orders made and the constitutional defects identified 
in the merits judgment. 
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124  See part 2.2 above. 
125  See part 2.3 above.  
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S LIEBENBERG PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  28 
The engagement order in Welkom High School gave effect to the doctrine 
of the separation of powers127 by preserving a realm of policy choice by the 
school governing bodies in designing new constitutionally-compliant 
pregnancy policies. However, as was the case in Hoërskool Ermelo, the 
Court issued no follow-up judgment consequent upon its supervisory orders, 
requiring the governing bodies to report back to the court both on the 
process followed in revising their pregnancy policies and to furnish copies 
of the relevant policies. No public judgment accordingly exists on whether 
the parties complied with the procedural obligations imposed upon them to 
engage meaningfully with each other in revising the pregnancy policies nor 
on whether the revised policies comply with the substantive guidelines in 
the main judgment on the implications of the various constitutional rights at 
stake.  
This is problematic in terms of providing broader guidance for the benefit of 
similarly affected learners on the implications of the Constitution and the 
Schools Act for school pregnancy policies.128 The lack of a follow-up 
judgment in response to supervisory remedies implicates the third and 
fourth remedial principles discussed above: substantive, transparent judicial 
reasoning and the principle of the separation of powers. Whilst the latter 
principle requires respect for the policy-making discretion of organs state, it 
also requires that a court ensure an effective remedy for constitutional rights 
violations. A subsequent public judgment would have vindicated the broader 
public interest in the constitutional dispute, and helped ensure 
constitutionally compliant pregnancy policies throughout the public 
schooling system in South Africa. The failure to deliver such a follow-up 
judgment was also a lost opportunity for the Court to provide guidance on 
the processes of meaningful engagement, particularly given the sharp 
difference of opinion between the majority and the minority on whether there 
had been sufficient engagement in the circumstances of the case.129 
In conclusion, the Welkom High School case demonstrates the potential of 
participatory remedies to redress violations of constitution rights in 
environments where sustained co-operation and engagement amongst a 
wider range of stakeholders is required to secure a sustainable, effective 
                                            
127  See the fourth remedial principle discussed in part 2.4 above. 
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above and accompanying text. 
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remedy. However, the full potential of the engagement remedy in the 
Welkom High School case was not realised due to the shortcomings 
discussed above.  
3.3  School admission policies: Rivonia Primary School  
3.3.1  Analysis 
The third case in the trilogy discussed in this article, Rivonia Primary School, 
also came before the Constitutional Court in the form of a challenge to the 
lawfulness of interventions by the Department of Education to overturn 
decisions of the school governing body and the principal of a public school. 
The underlying dispute concerned who had the final say over learner 
admissions to a public school.  
The school governing body of Rivonia Primary School had determined the 
capacity of Grade 1 enrolment in the school to be 120 learners, and refused 
admission to a Grade 1 learner on the basis that the school was full. The 
learner was accordingly placed on a waiting list for admission. The mother 
of the learner approached the HOD of education in the Gauteng province 
for assistance. The HOD was of the view that the school did have the 
capacity to admit the additional learner. Purporting to exercise his powers 
in terms of provincial regulations, he proceeded to overturn the refusal of 
the learner's application and issued an instruction to the school to admit the 
learner with immediate effect. When the principal refused to admit the 
learner, the HOD withdrew her admissions function and delegated it to 
another official, who proceeded to admit the learner to the school. The 
principal was subsequently subject to a disciplinary hearing for failing to 
comply with the HOD's instruction.130 
The school approached the South Gauteng High Court on an urgent basis 
for declaratory relief and an interdict to invalidate the Department's decision 
to override the school's admission policy, the forced admission of the 
learner, and the withdrawal of the principal's admission function. This relief 
was rejected by the High Court on the basis that the Department is 
empowered to intervene where necessary to protect children's access to 
schooling.131 The school governing body's appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal was upheld on the basis that the school governing body was vested 
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131  MEC for Education v Governing Body of the Rivonia Primary School 2013 6 SA 582 
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with the power to determine the admission policy and capacity of the 
school.132 
The MEC for Education appealed this judgment to the Constitutional Court. 
A majority of the Constitutional Court (per Mhlantla AJ as she then was) 
held that, although a School Governing Body did have the power to 
determine the school's capacity, the provincial education department 
retained ultimate authority over admissions in terms of both the Schools Act 
and provincial education regulations.133 In this regard, the Constitutional 
Court overruled the SCA by finding that the HOD was empowered to issue 
an instruction to the principal of a public school to admit a learner in excess 
of the limit set in its admission policy.134 
However, the Department's power to override the admissions decision of a 
school had to be exercised reasonably and in a procedurally fair manner in 
terms of the requirements of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 
of 2000 (PAJA).135 In the present case, these duties of procedural fairness 
should have included affording the principal an opportunity to address it on 
factors such as the impact of the proposed admission of the learner on the 
quality of education of other learners at the school, access to resources for 
the learner herself, and the time that might be required to accommodate the 
learner.136 This duty arose particularly in the light of the time lapse between 
the principal's initial reasons offered to the HOD for the rejection of the 
learner's admission application and the HOD's intervention in terms of the 
Gauteng regulations, almost 3 months later, when the new school year was 
already underway. The second consideration in favour of affording the 
principal a hearing was the fact that at the time of the intervention the tenth-
day admission statistics of the school had become available. The principal 
should have been afforded an opportunity to make representations to the 
department on the HOD's interpretation of these statistics or the implications 
of the actions contemplated in the light thereof.137 Thirdly, the Court was 
unpersuaded that the consultations held between the department and the 
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school from September to November of the previous school year satisfied 
the requirements of procedural fairness. The outcome of these 
consultations appeared to be that the departmental officials acknowledged 
the school's position that the learner would have to wait her turn on the 
waiting list for admission to the school, and the District Director had 
indicated a willingness to assist with the alternative placement of the learner 
if her parents were in agreement with this proposal.138 The actions of the 
Department in February of the new school year came as "a rude shock" to 
the school, which was operating under the impression that the matter had 
been resolved.139 The intervention accordingly violated the prescripts of 
procedural fairness, given the school's legitimate expectation of a hearing 
prior to the intervention.140  
However, the Court went further than upholding a duty of procedural 
fairness in the circumstances, holding that "the partnership and cooperation 
framework" envisaged in the Schools Act created additional duties in the 
context of dealing with systemic capacity constraints in the public schooling 
system.141 It was "the required general norm" that disputes between school 
governing bodies and national or provincial governments should be 
resolved through cooperation in order to protect the best interests of 
learners and the realisation of the right to basic education.142 The majority 
highlighted the critical role of engagement in realising the right to education 
in the context of systemic capacity issues in public schools.143 Planning, 
coordination and collaboration between all stakeholders was essential for 
ensuring that there were sufficient school places for all children. 
Accordingly, a duty of "proper engagement" between all affected parties 
arose where a provincial department required a school to admit learners in 
excess of the limits stated in a school's admission policy.144 The Court cited 
the main and concurring judgments in the Welkom High School case in 
emphasising the significance and purpose of good faith engagement in 
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education rights disputes.145 The majority held that the HOD's actions 
undermined the engagement which had taken place late in the previous 
school year. It raised the spectre of high-handed, unilateral intervention in 
disregard of the roles of school governing bodies within the partnership 
model of school governance established by the Schools Act.146  
The governing body's reaction was regarded by the majority as being 
equally problematic. By resorting to litigation to safeguard its own authority, 
it failed to place the interests of the learner first. In addition to declaratory 
relief in respect of its own powers, it also sought relief requiring the learner 
to be placed in another primary school until she could be accommodated at 
Rivonia Primary. This relief was sought despite the fact that the admission 
of one additional learner would not be unduly burdensome.147 The Court 
emphasised that the duty of cooperation to reach an amicable solution was 
"intimately connected" to the best interests of the child.148 The dispute was 
likely to have had a traumatic effect on a young, vulnerable learner. As the 
Court noted, the principle of co-operative governance was not only a tool to 
facilitate smooth inter-governmental relations, but also helped protect the 
very people whom government serves.149 The effective resolution of 
complex structural problems in the education system impacting on the 
constitutional rights of learners depended on a joint endeavour to find 
workable solutions without resorting to court in every skirmish.150  
Although the Court devoted some ten paragraphs of its judgment to the 
importance of co-operative governance and good faith engagement in 
education rights disputes, it made no specific remedial order in respect of 
this aspect of its judgment. It set aside the order of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal and replaced it with three declaratory orders confirming:  
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1) that the HOD was empowered to issue an instruction to the principal 
of the Rivonia Primary School to admit the learner in excess of the 
limit in its admission policy;  
2) in exercising this power the HOD was obliged to act in a procedurally 
fair manner; and  
3) that the HOD had not acted in a procedurally fair manner when he 
issued instructions to the principal of Rivonia Primary School to admit 
the learner and when he placed the learner in the school.151  
Two justices, Jafta and Zondo JJ, dissented and would have upheld the 
Department's right to instruct the principal to admit the learner. They were 
of the view that the procedural fairness point was not pleaded nor supported 
by the established facts.152 Similarly they held that the resolution of systemic 
capacity issues in the school through co-operation and meaningful 
engagement was not an issue in the relevant pleadings. The sole issue 
before the Court was whether the HOD had the power to overturn the 
principal's decision and admit the learner to the school. In this regard, they 
held that the principle of constitutional supremacy entitled a HOD to override 
a policy which was inconsistent with the Constitution.153 The main 
judgment's criticisms of the failure of the HOD to engage meaningfully with 
the school on systemic capacity issues did not form part of the ratio 
decidendi of the judgment.154 However, even in relation to systemic capacity 
issues, the minority disputed that the department failed to engage and 
cooperate with the school, describing the various meetings and 
consultations that were held with the school.155 According to the minority, 
"[f]aced with a contemptuous governing body and an intransigent principal, 
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it is difficult to imagine that the Head of Department could have acted 
differently."156 
3.3.2  Evaluation 
The facts of the Rivonia Primary School case clearly implicated the right to 
basic education in section 29(1)(a) of the Constitution. Both the majority and 
minority judgments were unequivocal that both the Constitution and the 
Schools Act permitted the provincial education department to override a 
school's refusal to admit a learner even when it would exceed the admission 
limits set by the governing body of that school. However, as noted above, 
the majority held that interventions in school admission decisions constitute 
administrative action and attract the duties of procedural fairness in terms 
of section 3(1) of the PAJA. The majority failed to clarify how this duty of 
procedural fairness relates to the duties of meaningful engagement and 
cooperative governance when dealing with systemic capacity issues in 
public schools. Moreover, the actual remedial orders dealt only with the duty 
of procedural fairness. No orders – whether declaratory, mandatory or 
supervisory – were made in relation to meaningful engagement, despite the 
main judgment's emphasis placed on its critical role in dealing with 
education rights disputes. Perhaps it was unnecessary to do so in the 
circumstances of the particular case. However, if meaningful engagement 
is a constitutional duty in education rights disputes, as affirmed by the Court 
in both in the Rivonia Primary School and the Welkom High School cases, 
one would expect at least a declaratory order on this requirement. Such an 
order would have given effect to the third remedial principle discussed 
above relating to a demonstrable link between the constitutional duties 
found to be infringed and the remedial orders made.157  
Another possible reason for the Court's failure to make any specific order 
relating to meaningful engagement is that it considered engagement duties 
to be subsumed in the orders pertaining to procedural fairness. However, 
as the Court's own reasoning on the scope of meaningful engagement 
suggest, the latter constitutes a participatory process between a number of 
stakeholders, and in the context of public schools gives expression to the 
partnership model created by the Schools Act.158 Its overarching objective 
is to give effect to the education rights entrenched in section 29 of the 
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Constitution through a structured process of both dispute resolution and 
collaborative decision making. As such, it transcends the rights to be notified 
and to be heard which underpin the rights to procedural fairness enshrined 
in sections 3 and 4 of PAJA.159 If meaningful engagement is to fulfil the 
broader objectives contemplated by the Court, it should be given teeth 
through explicit remedial orders.  
The majority judgment could also have elaborated in greater detail on the 
nature and scope of this duty in the specific circumstances of the Rivonia 
Primary School case. It will be recalled that the minority (despite considering 
this aspect of the majority judgment to be obiter dicta) were of the view that 
the Department had taken sufficient steps to co-operate and engage 
meaningfully with the school.160 In contrast, they regarded the school 
governing body and principal to be in breach of the duties of good faith 
engagement and cooperation.161 Through clarifying what precisely 
meaningful engagement entails and the mechanisms through which it 
should occur, better effect would have been given to the second principle 
concerning substantive reasoning.162 
The Rivonia Primary School case affirms meaningful engagement as a 
significant constitutional obligation in the context of education rights 
litigation. However, despite the emphasis on collaborative governance and 
meaningful engagement, the judgment fails to develop the potential of 
collaborative engagement as a remedy to redress the structural barriers 
facing learners in accessing quality education.  
4 Conclusion 
Currently public schooling for the majority of overwhelmingly poor, black 
learners in South Africa is of a poor quality, whilst admissions in many well-
resourced former Model C schools remain racially skewed.163 The legacy of 
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apartheid education is far from being effectively redressed. In the powerful 
words of Moseneke DCJ:  
In an unconcealed design, the Constitution ardently demands that this social 
unevenness be addressed by a radical transformation of society as a whole 
and of public education in particular.164  
The language, gender and admission barriers to quality schooling must 
surely be critical elements in the constitutional imperative of educational 
transformation identified by the Deputy Chief Justice. However, as the three 
cases analysed and evaluated in this article show, there are powerful 
stakeholders in schools who seek to defend policies that are inconsistent 
with constitutional rights and values. Provincial education departments' 
attempts to counter these policies have been set aside because the relevant 
authorities failed to comply with the procedures laid down in the Schools Act 
and the procedural fairness obligations of PAJA.  
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court has sought in these cases to reach 
the underlying substantive issues in these cases by affirming a duty of all 
stakeholders to cooperate and engage meaningfully with one another. 
Beyond the virtues of engagement as a dispute-resolution mechanism, it 
also provides a structured, participatory remedial process for amending 
policies to give effect to the rights of learners to education on a non-
discriminatory basis. As Sturm and others have noted, participatory 
remedies are well suited to redressing deeply entrenched patterns of 
institutional resistance to fundamental change.165 Once and for all court 
orders are likely to be undermined by overt and covert forms of resistance. 
Engagement remedies have significant potential to promote the adoption of 
constitutionally compliant education policies through requiring sustained 
collaboration amongst a broad array of stakeholders in the sector. 
Collaborative (rather than unilateral, top-down) policy-making is more likely 
to be perceived to be legitimate by affected stakeholders, thus increasing 
their prospects of effective implementation over time. Moreover, as 
Froneman and Skweyiya JJ emphasised in their concurring judgment in the 
Welkom High School case, sustained communication between the parties 
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is critical to protecting the learners' interests in a school governance 
dispute.166  
However, the analysis of the three cases demonstrates that the role of 
meaningful engagement as a remedy remains undeveloped, and its 
application falls short of the four core principles of remedial efficacy and 
legitimacy developed in part 2. In Hoërskool Ermelo, the significance of 
engagement was implicit in the reasoning of the Court in reaching the 
underlying language and access to education issues, but played no explicit 
part in the remedial reasoning or orders. In the Welkom High School case, 
meaningful engagement formed part of both the Court's reasoning and 
remedial orders. However, it incorporated only a limited range of 
stakeholders, and there was no follow-up judgment indicating whether the 
Court was satisfied with the outcome of the engagement process. It is 
unclear therefore whether the engagement process resulted in revised 
pregnancy policies which were consistent with the various constitutional 
obligations described in the main judgment. In the Rivonia Primary School 
case, cooperation and engagement were again affirmed as constitutional 
obligation in dealing with systemic capacity issues in schools. However, the 
majority judgment did not clarify how such engagement relates to 
obligations of procedural fairness, and did not refer to engagement in its 
remedial reasoning and orders.  
The valuable role which engagement can potentially play as a remedial 
mechanism in education rights disputes is best appreciated through 
understanding the different objectives pursued during the merits and 
remedial phase of a judgment. The merits phase of a judgment is concerned 
with determining whether not a constitutional violation has been established. 
As such, it should contain a clear exposition of the normative values and 
purposes of the relevant rights, and the nature of the duties they impose on 
the parties. A court should proceed to explain why a party's acts or 
omissions constitute an infringement of the relevant duties. The court's role 
at the remedial stage is different as it seeks to devise a remedy which will 
be effective and legitimate.167 In complex, polycentric cases such as those 
                                            
166  Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 166 – 167. 
167  As Sturm (1991) The Georgetown LJ 1445 notes:  
 "The nature of the court’s liability task – interpreting norms and determining 
parties’ responsibility – differs in important respects from the remedial task 
– implementing these norms in a particular context. We insist on developing 
uniform, general rules at the liability stage, but recognize that different 
contexts may require different remedial approaches to implement those 
norms. The court’s role in determining liability does not depend on the 
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involving school governance and access to education, there will often be a 
range of policy choices to be made in giving effect to the relevant rights, and 
a number of interests to be considered and weighed.168 This is where 
participatory remedies such as engagement have an important and valuable 
role to play. They respond to separation of powers concerns by counselling 
judicial restraint in prescribing particular policy solutions, but preserve the 
court's constitutional role to ensure that the rights violation is effectively 
remedied. The recruitment of a broad range of stakeholders to participate 
jointly in (re-)designing and implementing constitutionally-compliant policies 
generates the information and skills necessary for sustainable solutions 
and, as argued above, promotes trust and buy-in amongst all affected 
stakeholders.169  
Although the role of meaningful engagement has been inconsistent and 
undeveloped in the cases reviewed, the Constitutional Court has affirmed 
its important role in resolving systemic educational disputes. This paves the 
way for the development of meaningful engagement as a fully-fledged 
participatory remedy in future education rights disputes.170 Such remedies 
constitute powerful vehicles for developing systemic policy reforms capable 
of advancing access to quality education for all South Africa's children.  
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